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BURDEN OF PROOF FOR RECOVERY ON ACCIDENT
POLICY WHERE THE DEFENSE IS SUICIDE-
VIRGINIA'S ANSWER
When the defense of suicide is raised in opposition to a claim for
recovery on a life insurance policy, on a double indemnity provision
for accidental death therein, or on an accident policy, courts are troubled
by the allocation of the burden of proof. If the claim is made on a
standard life insurance policy, suicide must be expressly excluded to
be a valid defense.' If so excluded, the defendant-insurer bears the
burden of proving that the death was suicidal.2 On the other hand, if
the claim for recovery is on an accident policy or on a double indem-
nity provision for accidental death within a life policy, the accepted
view is that the beneficiary bears the burden of bringing himself within
the provisions of the insurance contract.' These distinctions in alloca-
tion of the burden of proof have been widely recognized throughout
the United States, but the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently
determined that they would not be made in Virginia.
1 Suicide is encompassed within the risk insured by a life insurance policy; therefore
it must expressly be made an exception to coverage. See Parker v. DesMoines Life
Ass'n, 108 Iowa 117, 78 N.W. 826 (1899); Jackson v. Loyal Additional Ben. Ass'n, 140
Tenn. 495, 205 S.W. 318 (1918); Howell, Burden of Proof: Accidental Death Insurance,
31 INs. COUNSEL J. 223 (1964) (distinguishes between a true exception and a definitive
limitation); VANCE, INSURANCE § 94, at 560 (3d ed. 1951).
2 See Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1963); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Boone, 236 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956); Houston v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 137
F.Supp. 583 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957); Michael v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 334 P.2d 1090 (1959); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v.
Nash, 97 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1957); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 87 Ga. App. 919,
75 S.E.2d 663 (1953); Kettlewell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 4 f11.2d 383, 122
N.E.2d 817 (1954); Strassberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States, 196
Misc. 387, 91 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1949); Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 199, 119
S.E.2d 685 (1961); Life Ins. Co. v. Brockman, 173 Va. 86, 3 S.E.2d 480 (1939); Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 157 Va. 427, 161 S.E. 61 (1931); Life Ins. Co. v. Hairston, 108 Va.
832, 62 S.E. 1057 (1908); Cosmopolitan Life Ins. v. Koegel, 104 Va. 619, 52 S.E. 166
(1905).
3See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938); Travellers' Ins. Co. v.
McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (1888); Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111 (10th Cir.
1963); Lambert v. Nat. Casualty Co., 249 Ala. 85, 29 So.2d 572 (1947); Murray v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 143 Colo. 258, 352 P.2d 678 (1960); Bacon v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co.,
121 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1956); World Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 145 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1962); Magich
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 N.J.S. 33, 107 A.2d 665 (1954); United States
Nat. Bank v. Underwriters, 239 Ore. 298, 396 P.2d 765 (1964); Coleman v. Palmetto
State Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 384, 128 S.E.2d 699 (1962).
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:RECENT DECISIONS
In Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel4 the defense of suicide to re-
covery on an accident policy was raised by the insurer. The insured's
body was recovered from a reservoir, fully clothed and unmarked.
In his car, found locked at the water's edge, was the insured's hat,
containing his glasses, a pack of cigarettes and a handkerchief. In-
sured had made inferences of suicide to his wife, but she never took
him seriously. The Court, in allowing recovery, held that the plaintiff-
beneficiary had the burden of proving accidental death; that he was
aided in doing so by a presumption against suicide; that, in effect, the
presumption shifted the burden of proof to the defendant-insurer; and
that to overcome the presumption, the insurer had to do so by clear
and satisfactory evidence to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis
of accidental death.
Generally, in order for a beneficiary to recover under an accident
policy or a double indemnity provision within a life policy, he must
establish that the death of the insured was caused by violent, external,
and accidental means within the terms of the policy.5 It is also generally
recognized that if the beneficiary proves that the insured's death was
by violent and external means, a rebuttable presumption arises in the
beneficiary's favor that the death was not suicidal.6 Beyond this point,
4 209 Va. 332, 163 S.E. 2d 577 (1968).
5 See O'Bar v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 232 Ala. 463, 168 So. 580 (1936);
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 82 Ga. App. 82, 60 S.E.2d 547 (1950); Evans v. Continental
Life & Accident Co., 88 Idaho 254, 398 P.2d 646 (1965); Goldstein v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co, 324 IlM. App. 168, 57 N.E.2d 645 (1944); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Glassman, 224 Ind. 641, 65 N.E.2d 503 (1946); Allison v. Bankers Life Co., 230 Iowa
995, 299 N.W. 889 (1941); McKenzie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Kan. 439, 112 P.2d
86 (1941); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Keeling's Adm'x, 271 Ky. 558, 112 S.W.2d
994 (1938); Costello v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 236 Mo. App. 1103, 162 S.W.2d 322
(1942); Dalbey v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States, 105 Mont. 587, 74
P.2d 432 (1937); Hrybar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 437, 45 N.E.2d 114
(1942); McCarty v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 268 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1954); Seater v. Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 Ore. 542, 156 P.2d 386 (1945); Goethe v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Murray, 120 Va. 115, 90 S.E. 620 (1916); Dorsey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 124 W.Va. 100, 19 S.E.2d 152 (1942); Annot., 142 A.L.R. 742 (1943); Annot.,
12 A.L.R.2d 1264 (1950).
6 The presumption is based on love of life and man's inherent nature not to destroy
himself. See Hines v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 357 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1956);
Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1963); Boswell v. Gulf Life Ins.
Co., 227 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1955); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bell, 188 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1951);
United Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 119 A.2d 925 (D.C. 1956); Kennesaw Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Templeton, 102 Ga. App. 867, 118 S.E.2d 247 (1960), rev'd, 216 Ga. 750,
119 S.E.2d 547, aff'd per curian, 103 Ga. App. 562, 120 S.E.2d 128 (1961); Turner v.
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however, the cases cease to be uniform, as the courts begin to take dif-
ferent approaches to the weight and sufficiency of the presumption.
Many courts recognize the so-called Thayer theory7 which views
the presumption as merely a procedural device to shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the other party.8 Under this theory
the presumption disappears when varying amounts9 of evidence are
introduced in rebuttal.10 A second theory is that the presumption has
evidentiary weight and is considered by the trier of fact as evidence."'
Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 316 Mich. 6, 24 N.W.2d 534 (1946); Lynde v.
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1956); Moorman v. Nat.
Casualty Co., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 68 N.E.2d 359 (1946), motion to dismiss appeal denied,
48 Ohio L. Abs. 447, 75 N E.2d 77, rev'd, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 61, 75 N.E.2d 806 (1947);
Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Maples, 204 Okla. 1195, 228 P.2d 363 (1951); Lawson, The Law
of Presumptions: A Look at Confusion, Kentucky Style, 57 Ky. L.J. 7, 47 (1968);
Richardson and Breyfogle, Problems of Proof in Distinguishing Suicide from Accident,
56 YALE L.J. 482 (1947).
7 THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAWV, Appx. B,
575, 576 (1898).
8See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938); Hill v. American
Home Assurance Co., 193 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1967); Hamilton v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 71 Ga. App. 784, 32 S.E.2d 540 (1944); 9 WIGMOPRE, EVIDENCE, § 2491 (3d ed. 1940);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 304 (1942). But see UNrFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 14 (1953).
9 Courts and authorities have failed to be uniform in determining the weight of
evidence necessary to overcome the presumption. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938) (substantial); Hamilton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 71 Ga.
App. 784, 32 S.E.2d 540 (1944) (credible); Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co,
155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721, 730 (1959) (". .. until the contrary evidence persuaded the
fact finder that the balance of probabilities was in equilibrium"); Hrybar v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 437, 24 Ohio 437, 45 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1942) ("evidence
to the contrary"); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763,
767 (1940) (positive); Woodmen of the World v. Alexander, 239 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922) (sufficient); Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 6, 192 A. 184, 188
(1937) ("enough . . . to make a question for the jury"); 9 WcMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2491
(3d ed. 1940) ("enough to satisfy the judge's requirement of some evidence").
10This theory is also referred to as the rule of disappearing presumptions. See
generally Beaver v. Fidelity Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1963); Hinds v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959); DiPaoli v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 384 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App. 1964); Mustard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins, 183
Neb. 15, 157 N.W.2d 865 (1968); Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 163 S.E.2d 672
(W.Va. 1968).
llSee Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Houston, 241 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1957); Alliance
Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958); Equitable Life Assurance
Soc. of United States v. Irelan, 123 F.2d (9th Cir. 1941); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383 (1930); Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cobbs,
23 Ala. App. 205, 123 So. 94 (1929); Byers v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 133 Cal.
App. 632, 24 P.2d 829 (1933); Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 233 Iowa 5,
7 N.W.2d 21 (1942); Eckendorff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 La. 183, 97 So. 394
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A third theory would utilize the presumption to shift the burden of
proof to the insurer who must then establish suicidal death.'2
The Virginia Supreme Court in the Daniel case recognizes the bene-
ficiary's initial burden of proof and the presumption that arises in his
favor. The Court in Daniel, however, synthesizes the second and third
theories stated above to produce a rule which heavily favors the bene-
ficiary. Under Daniel not only does the presumption stand throughout
the trial to be considered as evidence, but it is also used to shift the
burden of proof to the insurer who must negate every reasonable
hypothesis of accidental death in order to prevail. It must be noted,
however, that the decision is not an arbitrary defiance of the majority
rule in the United States, but an unavoidable consequence of prior
case decisions in this state.
One of these cases 13 involved a claim on a life insurance policy where
the defense of suicide was interposed. The Virginia Court held that
there was a presumption of natural death and the burden was on
the insurer to establish suicide by clear and satisfactory evidence to the
exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death.
Using this decision as a foundation, the Court later held in Hatless v.
Atlantic Life Ins. Co.14 that the burden of proving suicide was on
the insurer where the beneficiary's claim was based on a double in-
demhity provision for accidental death within a life policy. Because
such double indemnity provisions are essentially the same as accident
policies,15 the Virginia Court, in order to follow the principal of stare
decisis, had no choice but to follow Harless in the recent Daniel de-
cision. But the establishment of more equitable results should have
outweighed the Court's inclination to follow the Harless decision.
Daniel provided the Court with an excellent opportunity to bring
the law of Virginia into line with the great majority of jurisdictions.
(1923); Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942); Wycoff
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 185, 191
(1936); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1264, 1368 (1950); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 19, 35, 45 (1966).
12See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 439, 443 (1959); Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Sims, 206 Ark. 1069, 189 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1945); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Little, 146 Ark. 70, 225 S.W. 298 (1920); Svihovec v. Woodmen Accident Co., 69 N.D.
259, 285 N.W. 447, 449 (1939).
13 Life Ins. Co. v. Brockman, 173 Va. 86, 3 S.E.2d 480 (1939).
14 186 Va. 826,44 S.E.2d 430 (1947).
15 The language of the insuring clause in each case is essentially the same-i.e., loss
of life "by bodily injury effected soley through violent, external, and accidental means
and if such bodily injury is the direct, independent, and proximate cause of death."
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:330
To overrule Harless, applicable to double indemnity provisions, and to
apply the majority rule to accident policies as well, would have ac-
complished the necessary result. Without specifically overruling Har-
less, the Court could not have applied the majority rule in Daniel with
effective results.'" As for the presumption against suicide, one of two
alternatives would have produced a better solution: 1) the presumption
should stand, 7 but the amount of evidence necessary for the insurer
to overcome it should be reduced, or 2) the presumption should fall
upon the introduction of evidence to the contrary' and the jury should
consider the problem in light of all the evidence presented by both
parties. Once the presumption is invoked, the burden of going forward
with the evidence should shift to the insurer. The risk of non-persua-
sion, however, should still be upon the beneficiary. 19 Such a solution
would tend somewhat to relieve the insurer of the extremely heavy
burden which has been thrust upon him.
What effect this burden will have upon insurance companies and on
similar future actions can only be speculative at this point. Certainly
the bargaining power of insurance companies will be impaired when
they are faced with settlement on such claims. Knowing the extreme
burden that the insurer must bear, no beneficiary will be inclined to
settle his claim if he feels he can be more justly compensated by the
court. Consequently, a greater number of disputes on accidental death
should go to trial. It is well established that voluntary settlement of
disputes between parties is to be encouraged,20 but the effect of the
Daniel decision may be to discourage such settlements.
Faced with the problem of increasing litigation and a resultant m-
crease in payments, insurance companies will have to deploy some
scheme of absorption or set-off. Such a scheme could be in the form
16 To do so would have established a separate rule for allocating the burden of proof
in claims on accident policies, while leaving the rule for allocation in claims on life
policies and on double indemnity provisions therein equated and unchanged. Such
distinctions would have been unprecedented in the law. The distinctions that have,
in fact, been made by the Daniel decision may be unprecedented, but at least they are
simpler-apply the same rule in all three situations.
17 See cases cited note 9 supra.
18 See cases cited note 10 supra.
19 The idea is based, of course, on the universal proposition that the burden of proof
never shifts, only the burden of going forward with the evidence.
20 See Bergman v. Bergman, 247 Iowa 98, 73 N.W.2d 92 (1955); Bakke v. Bakke, 242
Iowa 612, 47 N.W.2d 813 (1951); Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 159 Neb. 57,
65 N.W.2d 233 (1954).
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of a reduction of policy benefits or an increase in exclusions from the
policies. Therefore, the interests of a great number of people may be
subjected to the interest of a "big business" institution. The effect of
the decision then is that the defendant-insurer is faced with inequitable
results and his efforts to compensate for such results may bring about
inequities for many policy holders.
S.T.T.
